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A Constructive U.S. Counter to EU State Aid Cases
by Itai Grinberg
U .S. Treasury officials and members of Congressfrom both parties have expressed concern that the
European Commission’s current state aid investigations
are disproportionately targeting U.S.-based multina-
tional enterprises.1 At the same time, a Treasury offi-
cial recently suggested in congressional testimony that
there are limits to what Treasury can do beyond
strongly expressing its concerns to the commission. In
that testimony, Treasury’s representative hinted at two
specific pressure points: whether the state aid investiga-
tions could undermine U.S. tax treaties with EU mem-
ber states; and whether any assessments paid by the
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNEs as a result of state
aid investigations would be creditable for U.S. income
tax purposes.
Thus far, no one has raised a third pressure point:
the potential application of section 891 of the U.S. tax
code, which specifically addresses discriminatory taxa-
tion of U.S. MNEs. If the Obama administration were
to find that the EU state aid cases imposed discrimina-
tory taxes on corporations of the United States, U.S.
income tax rates on citizens and corporations of cer-
tain European countries could double. Although the
United States has never applied section 891, this may
be a case where its consideration is appropriate.
Why wouldn’t Treasury study the issues raised by
the EU state aid investigations under section 891? The
answer might be that section 891 feels like a provision
from a bygone era, primarily because the issues it ad-
dresses simply have not arisen in decades.
But section 891 seems to have been enacted pre-
cisely to address concerns like those raised by the EU
state aid investigations. Moreover, studying the ques-
tions that arise under section 891 represents a less dras-
tic and more pragmatic U.S. response than threatening
to terminate our tax treaties. It also opens the possibil-
ity of imposing a consequence that is meaningful to
foreign sovereigns, unlike the prospect that the United
States would deny foreign tax credits to U.S. MNEs.
Finally, as a legal matter, the questions that arise under
section 891 regarding the EU state aid investigations
may chronologically precede the questions that arise
under section 901. Thus, focusing on the questions that
section 891 poses could be a means to encourage Euro-
pean institutions to conclude the EU state aid cases in
a sensible manner.
1See e.g., Testimony of Robert Stack, deputy assistant Treas-
ury secretary (international tax affairs), Senate Finance Commit-
tee (Dec. 1, 2015), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/01dec2015Stack.pdf (‘‘We are concerned that
the EU Commission appears to be disproportionately targeting
U.S. companies.’’); Press Release, House Ways and Means Tax
Policy Subcommittee Chairman Charles W. Boustany Jr., R-La.,
Chairman Boustany Opening Statement: Examining the OECD
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project (Dec. 1, 2015),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/chairman-boustany-
opening-statement-examining-the-oecd-base-erosion-and-profit-
shifting-beps-project; and Remarks of Senate Finance Committee
Ranking Member Ron Wyden, D-Ore., at Finance Hearing on
OECD BEPS Reports (Dec. 1, 2015), available at http://
www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/international-tax-oecd-beps-
and-eu-state-aid.
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Background
EU State Aid
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) provides that state aid
that affects trade between EU member states and
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain un-
dertakings is incompatible with the EU single market.2
EU state aid rules require that incompatible state aid
be recovered in order to ameliorate the distortion of
competition created by the aid.
The state aid rules were originally designed to pre-
vent EU member states from subsidizing domestic en-
terprises. Under the state aid rules, the commission can
demand assessments that claw back state aid, including
what it views as underpaid taxes, going back 10 years
with interest. In a series of decisions reaching back
decades, the commission has found specific cases of
state aid that violate EU rules and required the offend-
ing member state to recover that aid from the affected
company.
State aid decisions focusing on indirect subsidies
provided through tax benefits are not new as a general
matter. The commission has been bringing tax-related
state aid cases since at least the mid-1980s. Tax-related
state aid decisions reached by the commission have
almost always been upheld by the Court of Justice of
the European Union.
Until the recent assault on U.S.-based MNEs, how-
ever, state aid cases in the tax area generally involved
statutory rules that selectively favored domestically
headquartered companies in a given EU member state.
In contrast, in the new cases the commission is claim-
ing that sovereigns provided illegal state aid to foreign-
headquartered companies merely by providing them
legal certainty through tax rulings that do not even
seem to be ‘‘selective’’ — in that similar rulings were
broadly available from the tax administrations of those
same EU governments. In addition, the new state aid
cases largely relate to transfer pricing matters, which
present notoriously difficult fact-specific determina-
tions. For these reasons, the current EU state aid tax
investigations are novel and unprecedented.
Moreover, the remedy state aid law imposes against
member states that provide illegal state aid is deeply
inappropriate when applied to a foreign firm instead of
the domestic ‘‘national champion’’ firms for which
state aid law was originally intended. In these cases,
when the commission finds that a member state has
provided illegal state aid, the remedy is to require that
member state to collect a revenue windfall from a
foreign-headquartered MNE. That does make for great
politics: When the commission reprimands a member
state for violating EU law, that member state wins.3
President Obama and others have suggested that, at
least in the technology sector, the European Commis-
sion’s regulatory agenda in the past few years has often
amounted to a protectionist attack on U.S. companies,
driven by frustration at European companies’ inability
to compete in that area.4 The new state aid investiga-
tions could be seen as part of that broader trend.5
Starting in 2013, the commission’s tax-related state aid
investigations have focused like a laser on rulings is-
sued to U.S. MNEs. In fact, all but one of the
company-specific investigations and almost all of the
amounts in controversy involve U.S. MNEs. This en-
forcement reality contrasts with the fact that tax rulings
of the type that the commission has recently decided to
examine were also routinely procured by European-
headquartered multinationals.
Section 891
Section 891 provides:
Whenever the President finds that, under the laws
of any foreign country, citizens or corporations of
the United States are being subjected to discrimi-
natory or extraterritorial taxes, the President shall
so proclaim and the rates of tax imposed by sec-
tions 1, 3, 11, 801, 831, 852, 871, and 881 shall,
for the taxable year during which such proclama-
tion is made and for each taxable year thereafter,
be doubled in the case of each citizen and corpo-
ration of such foreign country.6
In the course of congressional debate over section
891, Sen. David I. Walsh, D-Mass., presented a floor
statement that provides some insight into the statute’s
purpose. He suggested that if an administration were
to ‘‘cause inquiry to be made’’ into whether a foreign
tax was discriminatory, ‘‘it would seem natural that the
President, through his executive offices, might obtain
an agreement . . . to remove such features. If this were
done there would be no occasion for the President to
issue [a proclamation under Section 891], and the sec-
tion would have accomplished its result in an amicable
manner.’’7
2Consolidated Version of the TFEU, article 107(1), May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 91-92.
3Michael J. Graetz, ‘‘Behind the European Raid on McDon-
ald’s,’’ The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 3, 2015.
4See, e.g., Murad Ahmed, Duncan Robinson, and Richard
Waters, ‘‘Obama Attacks Europe over Technology Protection-
ism,’’ Financial Times, Feb. 16, 2015.
5Indeed, international relations scholars often point out that
state aid is one of the most politicized of the EU’s regulatory
policy levers. See, e.g., Michelle Cini, ‘‘The Soft Law Approach:
Commission Rule-Making in the EU’s State Aid Regime,’’ 8 J.
Eur. Pub. Pol’y 192 (2001).
6Sec. 103, Revenue Act of 1934 (1934) (current version at 26
IRC section 891 (2015)).
778 Cong. Rec. 9318, at 9319 (1934) (statement of Sen. David
I. Walsh).
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In the context of the EU state aid investigations tar-
geting foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-headquartered
MNEs, the language of section 891 raises two prelimi-
nary issues of statutory interpretation: the meaning of
‘‘corporations of the United States’’ and the meaning
of ‘‘being subjected to discriminatory taxes.’’
Walsh’s floor statement helps clarify the intent of
Congress as to those issues. He explained that the lan-
guage ‘‘corporations of the United States’’ was in-
tended to refer to ‘‘American concerns.’’ The discrimi-
nation section 891 was intended to combat does not
seem to be limited to tax burdens formally imposed on
the domestic subsidiaries of a U.S. MNE. Rather, in
light of the legislative history, the statutory term ‘‘cor-
porations of the United States’’ may be best under-
stood to encompass any subsidiary within the world-
wide affiliated group of a U.S. MNE. Thus, for
purposes of section 891, European subsidiaries of
Amazon, Apple, McDonald’s, and Starbucks are all
likely to be ‘‘corporations of the United States.’’
Walsh also explained that being subjected to dis-
criminatory taxes under the laws of a foreign country
referred to those taxes that are framed, imposed, and
enforced ‘‘so as to result in a special tax burden upon
American concerns, greater than those imposed on the
enterprises of [the foreign country] or of the most-
favored nation.’’ The issue that section 891 focuses on
is not, in the senator’s telling, solely about whether the
legal rule imposing a tax on an American concern is
facially neutral. Rather, whether a tax is discriminatory
seems intended to focus on the impact of the foreign
rule as applied.
Open Questions
A wide variety of questions about how section 891
might interact with the state aid cases — as well as the
application of section 891 more generally — have re-
ceived almost no attention. It might, therefore, be fruit-
ful for Treasury to make an open-ended request for
public comments. For instance, there are important
questions to be addressed about the relationship be-
tween section 891 and U.S. tax treaties, the circum-
stances under which a tax measure should be viewed
as being discriminatory, and the meaning of the term
‘‘foreign country’’ for purposes of section 891.
Section 891 and U.S. Tax Treaties
One might contend that section 891 contravenes
U.S. tax treaties and therefore has no effect. U.S. tax
treaties generally override domestic law by reducing
U.S. taxes on foreign persons in exchange for reciprocal
reductions in foreign taxes on U.S. persons. They also
uniformly include nondiscrimination articles. Under
U.S. law, treaties and statutes have coequal status.
When a revenue statute and a tax treaty provision con-
flict, generally the later-in-time rule is controlling.
Thus, one view might be that by doubling the rate of
tax on a foreign country’s citizens and corporations,
section 891 contravenes our treaties. In that case, since
all the relevant treaties were concluded after the enact-
ment of section 891, those treaties would prevail and
prevent application of section 891, so long as a treaty
with the particular EU member state remains in force.
On the other hand, a fundamental judicial tenet is
that treaties and statutes are to be reconciled wherever
possible. One question, therefore, is whether the appli-
cation of EU state aid rules in a discriminatory man-
ner, followed by retroactive revenue reclamation, would
be permissible under the United States’ tax treaties
with the relevant EU member states. For EU law pur-
poses, the TFEU generally trumps bilateral income tax
treaties, and so the fact that state aid findings may vio-
late the tax treaties of EU member states may not be
dispositive.
But for U.S. law purposes, the TFEU does not have
and cannot be granted this quasi-constitutional status.
To the extent that the outcomes of discriminatory state
aid cases violate the United States’ tax treaties with
EU member states, application of section 891 may not
be inconsistent with our tax treaties. Rather, the better
reading may be that section 891 remains an operative
provision, at least in part, to the extent that discrimina-
tory or extraterritorial taxation by a foreign country
violates the terms of a tax treaty of the United States.8
When a Tax Is Discriminatory
Under section 891, whether corporations of the
United States are subjected to discriminatory taxes un-
der the laws of a foreign country appears to refer to
the manner in which the taxes are imposed and en-
forced, rather than merely whether the underlying for-
eign rules being applied to corporations of the United
States are themselves facially neutral. That conclusion,
however, leaves open a very wide set of questions
about the standard for determining whether corpora-
tions of the United States are being subjected to dis-
criminatory taxes.
The Meaning of ‘Foreign Country’
Another open question turns on the meaning of the
term ‘‘foreign country’’ for purposes of section 891.
The meaning is important because if the administra-
tion were to conclude that U.S. corporations were be-
ing subjected to discriminatory taxes under the laws of
the EU (as opposed to the laws of a member state), a
question would arise whether the EU is a ‘‘foreign
country’’ for purposes of section 891.
Our understanding of the meaning of the term ‘‘for-
eign country’’ for international tax purposes depends
to a significant degree on a 1932 Supreme Court case,
8Alternatively, section 891 might be viewed as a statutory ve-
hicle for responding to tax treaty violations with a partial treaty
suspension. For a discussion of partial tax treaty suspensions, see
Richard L. Doernberg, ‘‘Selective Suspension or Termination of
Income Tax Treaty Provisions,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, Nov. 1990, p.
1130.
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Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co.9 In that case, the Court
held that subnational taxes imposed by the Australian
state of New South Wales were imposed by a foreign
country for purposes of the foreign tax credit because
the purpose of the FTC was to alleviate double taxa-
tion and the Court recognized that double taxation can
occur whether a foreign tax burden is imposed by a
national government or a regional one. In reaching that
conclusion, the Court made clear that ‘‘foreign coun-
try’’ is ambiguous. As the Court noted, ‘‘the term ‘for-
eign country’ is not a technical or artificial one, and
the sense in which it is used in a statute must be deter-
mined by reference to the purpose of the particular
legislation.’’10
When crafting section 891 in 1934, Congress would
have been aware of the 1932 decision in Chicago Portrait
— which at the time was the Court’s most recent inter-
national tax decision. Depending on the purpose of the
statute at issue, Chicago Portrait made clear that ‘‘for-
eign country’’ could mean either ‘‘foreign territory’’ or
‘‘foreign government’’ and, when referring to a foreign
government, ‘‘it may describe a foreign state in the in-
ternational sense,’’ but it might also mean ‘‘a foreign
government which has authority over a particular area
or subject-matter.’’11 Of course, the European Union
has a territory and is arguably a foreign government
with authority over particular subject matter, including
competition policy, as the commission’s actions in im-
posing state aid assessments clearly establish.
Sequence of Analysis
As Treasury considers the tax treaty issues, FTC
issues, and section 891 issues that arise when dealing
with the state aid investigations, one practical question
is: Which of these issues has to be dealt with first? Tax
treaty termination is a pure policy decision with no
required time frame for decision. Foreign tax creditabil-
ity is determined under the compulsory payment rules,
which require that a taxpayer exhaust all effective and
practical remedies, including available judicial appeals,
before claiming the credit.12
In contrast, EU law provides that once the commis-
sion decides that a member state provided a taxpayer
with illegal state aid, that state must act without delay
to recover that aid from the taxpayer.13 As a result, al-
though FTCs quite likely would not be available at the
time the commission reached a decision (since appeals
would be in process), that decision may mark the point
at which a corporation of the United States is sub-
jected to tax for purposes of section 891. Thus, the
section 891 issues may arise well before either the tax
treaty termination or section 901 issues are ripe.
Political Economy Considerations
The history of state aid law suggests that credible
sources of economic and political pressure have signifi-
cantly affected the development of EU state aid investi-
gations over time. Hinting that tax treaties might need
to be terminated is not, however, particularly credible
as a source of pressure on the European Commission.
The collateral damage caused by tax treaty termination
would be very substantial and probably disproportion-
ate to the harm caused by the current state aid investi-
gations for all parties concerned. Nor can the U.S.
bring credible pressure to bear on the commission by
threatening that EU state aid assessments will not be
creditable to U.S. MNEs. Indeed, the U.S. has already
indicated to the commission that EU state aid assess-
ments may be creditable foreign taxes for U.S. tax pur-
poses, in order to explain that the United States has a
direct stake in these proceedings, because if the FTC
applies, U.S. taxpayers will foot the entire bill for any
state aid assessments.
In contrast, section 891 constitutes a plausible
source of leverage in connection with the state aid
cases. Although the United States should be reluctant
to invoke section 891, that step is substantially less
drastic than terminating all EU member state tax trea-
ties. Moreover, given the lack of guidance on precisely
how section 891 applies, Treasury might be able to ap-
propriately limit the impact of any finding under sec-
tion 891.
Conclusion
This article started with a simple question: Why
shouldn’t Treasury consider the issues raised by EU
state aid investigations under section 891? True, tax
rates have never doubled under section 891, and many
tax lawyers have never heard of section 891. In an im-
portant sense, however, Congress intended these re-
sults: Section 891 was designed to create a deterrent
that would discourage foreign governments from dis-
criminating against U.S. citizens and businesses. Thus,
when the rule of law works as it should abroad, sec-
tion 891 simply does not come up. Maybe it is time for
Treasury to study section 891, if only to remind our
friends in the European Commission that it is the law
of the United States. ◆
9Burnet v. Chicago Portrait, 285 U.S. 1 (1932).
10Chicago Portrait, 285 U.S. at 6, citing Wayman v. Southard, 10
Wheat. 1, 29; Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 619, 635, 636; American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 293; United States v.
Louisville & N. R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 333; Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co.
v. Ward, 242 U.S. 1, 4; and Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor,
253 U.S. 345, 348.
11Chicago Portrait, 285 U.S. at 5.
12Treas. reg. section 1.901-2(e)(5) (2015). 13OJ L 83/1 (Mar. 27, 1999), as amended, article 14.
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